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STArrEMENT OF FACTS
This case does not involve a lot of money but the principle involved is great and for the reason that the court, in
making its decision said (R. 130) :
"Gentlemen, this court is committed to the doctrine
in these kind of cases, on through highways, the proximate cause must rest solely on him who makes the left
turn. Until the Appellate Court overturns that doctrine, that will remain the rule in this District."
He again repeated himself on this doctrine
line 20) :

in

(R.

131

"So, while I find both parties guilty of negligenceand I repeat that until such time as I am instructed
1
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otherwise by an Appellate Tribunal-the findings and
conclusion must be as indicated by the. language cited
by coung,el, used by Mr. Justice Wolfe, that he who
makes the left turn on these through highways must
take the responsibility irregardless of speed, or any
other circumstances."
This theory of the Court, as set out above, unbeknown
to counsel, was in the mind of the tryer of the facts at the
beginning of the trial. It mattered not what cases might
be cited in support of counsel's contentions in behalf of his
client; it mattered not how careless the opposing party
might be; what laws he might break or with how much
speed the opposing party might drive upon a through highway, if my client turned to the left and an accident resulted,
my client is guilty of negligence which, in the· opinion of the
court, is the sole proximate cause of the accident. The
other party might be guilty of negligence but under no circumstances can it be a proximate ·cause. This theory, according to the Court will remain the doctrine of this District unless the Appellate Court of the State of Utah in a
decision appealed from Box Elder County, where the Honorable Judge Lewis Jones was presiding, should advise him
otherwise.
Consequently I say in all sincerity, and I firmly believe
that the statements made by the Court (R. 130-131) :
"This court is committed to the doctrine in these kind
of cases, on through highways, the proximate cause
must rest solely on him who makes the left turn - - - That he who makes the left turn on these through highways must take the responsibility irre·gardless of speed
or any other circumstance, - - - - "
is not the law and never has been and that such a doctrine
would, in fact, encourag-e dangerous driving for it offers a
2
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premium to any person who might be traveling a through
highway, if he utterly disregards the rights of any person
who might wish to cross the same, by giving him immunity
from all his wrongs, regardless of what they are, if an accident takes place. Consequently this appeal must follow.
This is an intersection collision. Plaintiff was traveling south on Highway 308 approaching Bear River City,
Utah. The defendant had been traveling North on said
highway but stopped his car East of the hard-surface thereof on said highway and some 20 or 30 feet South from the
intersection in question for the purpose of talking business
with another party. The other party had been driving a
truck but upon receiving a signal from the defendant, he
stopped his truck on the East side of the highway after he
had passed the intersection in question and at a point off
the hard-surface and about 100 feet North from the intersection. Both the defendant and the trucker got out of
their cars and met together in the intersection, East of the
hard-surfaced portion, and talked over their business.
When the conversation ended, the defendant went South to
his parked car and the trucker went North to his parked
truck and both started their motors, preparatory to driving
off. The trucker commenced to go back on the hard-surface
"
of the highway, slowly, as he proceeded in a northerly direction and the defendant commenced to make a left turn
at the intersection from the point where he was stopped on
the East side of the highway, so as to go to his home which
is located about a block West from that intersection.
Highway 308 is an arterial highway which passes
through Main Street, Bear River City, Utah, where the defendant lives. At the intersection in question, both the
Main Highway and the intersecting street are 99 feet wide.
The intersecting street is gravel while the arterial highway
3
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is hard...~surfaced for 22 feet in the center. North of the intersection and on the West side of the arterial highway at a
point approximately 375 feet to the North of the intersection is a State Road sign fixing the speed at 40 miles per
hour, as you proceed. South from that point. North of that
sign the posted speed is 60 miles per hour in the daytime.
Two blocks North of the intersection in question, is a sign
reading "Entering Bear River City." The day was clear
and the highway dry and the accident happened at approximately 11 :45 A. M. The plaintiff testified (R. 57 and 58)
that when he reached the 40 mile zone, he was doing 60
miles an hour and the Court (R. 131 line 12) found:
"In accordance with their testimony I expressly find
that the plaintiff's car was going over 60 miles an hour
as it cam·e up to that 40 mile zone and it was going 5
miles or more in excess of 40 miles an hour as it approached the intersection."
The plaintiff claimed that he was going 45 miles an
hour, jus.t prior to the accident, but admitted that he had
never looked at his speedometer (R. 72 line 30) . The plaintiff'~s wife also testified that just befor·e the collision they
were doing 40 to 45 miles an hour, but she admits that she
did not look at the speedometer (R. 75). They both testify
that they did not see the Petersen car turn West across their
lane until they were 100 feet away from him (R. 58 line 8)
(R. 68 line 20) (R. 74 line 26). - It so happened that another vehicle was traveling back of the Walker car. The
party driving it being a Mr. Madsen, and even though he
was back and further down the highway to the North, he
testified (R. 84 line 20) that he saw both the truck that was
parked and the defendant's car that was parked, start to
move from their positions on the East side of the highway
at about the same time. One appeared to be going to back
4
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upon the highway and going North which was the truck, and
the other car appearing to make what he thought was a U
turn, though farther down the street he saw the defendant's
car turn from its parked position and start west (R. 84)
across the intersection, even though plaintiff did not see
him at all until he started across the center line. (R. 58)
A Highway Patrol Officer testified (R. 97) where the
point of the accident happened, being on the West side of the
hard-surface of the road halfway through the intersection.
That from that point the officer went northerly along the
road and found skid marks on the cement from the Cadillac
car, belonging to the plaintiff, for a distance of 148 feet. He
also testified (R. 98) beginning with line 24, that from the
point of impact, the Walker car continued for a distance of
42 feet. Also, that the defendant's car which was a Mercury sedan, was knocked back Southeast across the highway from the point of impact, heading the car again in a
Southeast direction, being just opposite from where it was
heading, a distance of 72 feet. Or, in other words, the
plaintiff's car had skid marks of 148 feet prior to the point
of impact and if we deduct the 148 feet from the 375 feet to
the reduce speed sign, we would have 227 feet that the Cadillac car traveled before the brakes took hold from the 40
miles an hour sign and at said. sign the Court found he was
going in excess of 60 miles per hour which would be just
2~ seconds travel time at 60 miles an hour.
Now, this question comes up. Would the speed of the
Cadillac car in 2~ seconds time when it was traveling in
excess of 60 miles on hour, drop down without its brakes
being applied, over two or three miles an hour? The truck
driver, Brook Shuman, watched the plaintiff's car come
down the highway (R. 108) when he started to drive his car
North from its parked position, and we must remember that
5
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plaintiff's witness Madsen said they both (defendant and
Shuman) started to drive off at the same time, that the
plaintiff's car was at least one block North of where the
truck was. That he noticed this car coming because there
was a_ reduce speed sign there and officers had been watching people rather close in that zone. That he heard the
brakes go on when the plaintiff's car was just a little in front
of his truck. Again at (R. 110} this same Mr. Shuman
testified that he did not see the plaintiff slacken his speed
at all prior to the 'Screeching of the brakes ; that he was in
his line of vision all the time and that in his opinion he was
going sixty miles an hour at the time he applied his brakes.
On the other hand Mr. Petersen testified (R. 118)
and
(R. 119) that he was well out into the intersection when
the plaintiff's car reached. the 40 mile zone. He also testified (R. 122) that he started to drive his car away at the
same time the truck started to move off. He said he was
parked between 20 or 30 feet from the intersection on the
East side of the hard-surfaced portion (R. 124). He testified on cross examination (R. 125) that he checked the road
behind him before he started to drive. off. That he gave
an arm signal and light signal and that the plaintiff was
then halfway between the 40 mile zone sign and the cross
road further to the North. Coun~el for plaintiff cross examined for this and received. the following answer:
"No, I didn't tell you that, I told you he was half of
the 40 miles where the 40 mile zone starts. He was in
the half of that other block where that street comes
down.
Q. Then you are trying to tell me he was still in the
60 mile zone ?
A. Yes.
Q. So he was still in the 60 mile zone when you pulled
off on to the highway?
6
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A. That's right.
If this estimate were correct then the plaintiff was between
550 and 600 feet away when the defendant started to drive
across the street.
Petersen admitted that he did not continue to watch the
Walker car all the tirae, after he had determined that it
was safe to cross and after he had started in a westerly direction, he did not look again to the North until the plaintiff
honked his horn (R. 127) and that he was across the center
line heading West when he heard the horn honked. That
he estimated his own speed between 5 and 6 miles an
hour (R. 129) .
After both parties rested, the Court announced his doctrine that the proximate cause must rest solely on him who
makes the left turn irregardless of speed or any other circumstance, but found plaintiff guilty of negligence.
STATEMENT' O·F PO~INTS
POINT 1. That the Court erred in failing to find the
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, after he found
the plaintiff guilty of negligence.
POINT 2. That the Court erred after finding that the
plaintiff was driving too fast for existing conditions and
was driving in excess of the posted speed upon said highway
and that said excessive speed was negligence in not also
finding that said negligence was a proximate cause of said
accident.
POINT 3. That the Court erred in failing to find that
the plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and that the
duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the favored
driver on an arterial highway as to a dis-favored driver on
an intersecting street and neither can excuse his own failure to observe because the other driver faild in his duty.
7
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POINT 4. That the Court erred in failing to find that
even though a driver making a left turn must yield the right
of way to cars which a~e close enough to constitute an immediate hazard, that said rule requires the exercise of
some judgment and that there is still a duty on the part of
the driver traveling the arterial highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility of the dis-favored driver starting across the intersection in the belief that he can cross in
safety, and. that his failure to remain alert and observe in
time to avoid an accident can contribute to and be a proximate cause of an accident.
POINT 5. That the Court erred in failing to find. that
all rights of way are relative and the duty to avoid accidents
or collisions at street intersections rests upon both drivers.
ARGUMENT
Inasmuch as all of the above points are closely related
and can be discussed together, the argument hereafter will
be addressed collectively to all of them.
Now first I wish to cite some of the sections of our
Utah Code.
Utah Code Annotated 1953 41-6-46. Speed regulations-Maximum speeds-School buses and school buildings-lnte·rsections-Powers of Governor-(a) No person shall drive a v·ehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing. In every event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the
highway in compliance with legal requirements and the
duty of all persons to use due care.
(b) Where no special hazard exi~sts the following
speeds shall be lawful but any speed in excess of said
limits shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not
reasonable or prudent and that it is unawful:
8
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(1) Twenty miles per hour.
Upon meeting or overtaking any school bus which has
stopped on the highway for the purpose of receiving or
discharging any school children, provided, such school
bus bears upon the front and rear thereof a plainly
visible sign containing the words school bus in letters
not less than 4 inches in height which can be removed
or covered when the vehicle is not in use as a school bus.
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school recess or while children are going to or
leaving school during opening or closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop
before passing a school building or grounds at any of
said periods.
(2) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or
residential district.
(3) Sixty miles per hour in other locations during
the daytime.
(4) Fifty miles per hour in such other locations during the night-time. Daytime means from half hour
before sunrise to half hour after sunset. Night-time
means at any other hour.
(c) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent
with the requirements of subdivision (a) of this section,
drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curv~, when
approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding road, and when special ha'zard exists
with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.
(d) Provided, that the governor by proclamation,
in time of war, or national emergency, may upon recommendation of the federal authorities, change the
speed on the highways of the state, to conform to such
recommendations.
Utah Code Annotated 1953 41-6-73 Vehicle turning left
at intersection.-The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the op...
posite direction which is within the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but
said driver, having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by this act, may make such
left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles approach9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing the intersection from said opposite direction shall
yield the right-of-way to the vehicle making the left
turn.
Utah· Code Annotated 1953 41-6-144. Brakes-Equipment required-Performance standard-Condition(a) the following brake equipment is required..
(1) Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle
or motor-driven cycle when operated upon a nighway
shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the
movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including two separate means of applying the brakes, each of
which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to
at least two wheels. If these two separate means of
applying the brakes are connected in any way, they
shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of
the operating mechanism shaH not leave the motor vehicle without brakes on at least two .lVheels.
(b) Every motor vehicle or combination of motor
drawn vehicles shall be capable at aH times, and under
all conditions of loading, of being stopped on a dry,
smooth, level road free from loose material, upon application of the service (foot) brake, within the distance
specified below, or shall be capable of being decelerated
at a sustained rate correspon<11ng to tnese di'Stances:
J.1~eet

Vehicles or combinations of vehiclei
having brakes on all
wheels.
Vehicles or comb ina tions of vehicles
not having brakes
on all wheels.

to stop

from 20 miles
P·er hour

Decelerated In
~ =eet per ~econd
Per Second

30

14

40

10.7

Now, can't we say this: If the plaintiff were going 45
miles per hour and saw the defendant at a distance that has
to be 250 feet or more (he left tire marks for 148 feet plus
time element to react at his speed per hour) and if his
brakes met the requirements of Section 41-6-144 he could
have stopped in sufficient time to avoid the accident? If
he did not stop then he was traveling faster than that speed.
or he was negligent in not having his car equipped with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
and Technology
by the Utah State Library.
brakes that could
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required by the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

statutes. Also, under the speed section 41-6-46, he must
have his car under control; drive no faster than is reasonable; reduce his speed when approaching an intersection and
be alert and attentive. If he drives. in a forty mile zone and
into an intersection at such a speed that he leaves brake
marks for a distance of 148 feet prior to the collision, and
42 feet thereafter and knocks a Mercury automobile 72
feet in the opposite direction, can we say that he satisfied
the requirements of our statutes or must we conclude that
his action, or lack of action was a proximate cause of the
collision.
Again the section on the rights of making a left turn
at an intersection does not define what distances amount to
"or so close thereto as. to con~titute an immediate hazard,"
and each case has to be determined individually. Consequently the cases, a number of which are list·ed hereafter,
hold that the rights and duties of each are relative and
neither has an absolute right of way over the other when
two vehicles are approaching each other and one intends to
make a left turn and as a matter of law neither can disregard the other. So now to the cases.
Cases: Plaintiff seems to lean quite heavily on the C·ederloff vs Whited 169 P. 2d 777. This case is not in point for
the following reasons: Plaintiff brought the action to recover damages for injuries which she sustained in an automobile collision between her car which was driven by her
son and a car driven by the defendant. The jury returned
a verdict of no cause of action and Plaintiff appealed and reversed. Plaintiff's car was being driven in a northerly direction on State Street on the east side of the street in the
traffic lane nearest the center. At the same time the defendant was driving his car in a southerly direction. When
11
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these cars were in the middle of the block the defendant
turned his car to the left into the course traveled by the
plaintiff's car and the two cars collided. The point of impact was a few feet east of the center line of the street.
The point of impact indicated that the front part of defendant's car was all that got beyond the center line of the
street. The testimony shows that plaintiff's car was traveling 25 to 30 miles an hour prior to the accident with
lighted head lights which complied with legal requirements.
The evidence also showed that the defendant put his arm
out of the window and signaled a left turn and that when
he did so he had slowed his car down to five miles an hour
at the time of the collision, but that he did not see plaintiff's
car at all before the collision. The plaintiff contended that
as a matter of law, defendant's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the collision and the resulting damage.
The court in making its determination, cited Sections 577-133 Utah Code Annotated 1943 which is the same as our
Section 41-6-69 and it is not an intersection case. The
court went on to show that under the circumstances in that
particular case, the driver of plaintiff's car would. either
believe that the defendant's car was slowing down waiting
for plaintiff to pass, or that the turning was made at such
a point where it would be physically impossible to avoid the
collision. The court found. that the sole proximate cause,
on the facts therein stated, was the left turn made by defendent, but it was not an intersection left turn. One of the
later cases shows the difference.
We have another case involving a turn in the center of
a block which is Hart vs. Kerr, cited as 175 P.2d 475. This
was an accident that took place in Ogden. The plaintiff
was traveling north on the east side of Washington Blvd. in
O~gden, Utah.
When he reached a point near the corner of

12
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17th Street, he was forced by repair work upon the highway
to turn to his left and upon the east lane of the west side
of Washington, in order to continue on north, had that
been his intention. At the same time the defendant was
driving south on Washington Blvd. on the west side thereof,
leaving room for north bound traffic to pass the obstruction.
However at that point, the plaintiff, instead
of continuing north, made a left turn for the purpose of
parking on the west side of Washington Blvd. and the defendant's automobile crashed into his side as he made the
left turn. The record showed the defendant was traveling
35 to 50 miles an hour and the court held as a matter of law,
that he was. guilty of negligence.
The lower court also
held that the plaintiff viola ted the requirements of Section
57-7-133 Utah code annotated 1943 which are turns from
a direct course on a highway and that he was guilty of
negligence and denied the plaintiff relief upon his complaint as well as the defendant on his counter claim. From
this the plaintiff appealed and the only thing before the
Supreme Court was whether or not the plaintiff was negligent when he made a left turn. They held that he was when
he failed to yield right of way.
So, in substance, this case is one where the defendant
was speeding and the plaintiff was making a left turn
and neither recovered.
Another Utah case that has been cited is Hickok vs.
Skinner 190 P.2d 514.
This covered an accident that
happened at the intersection of 21st South Street and West
Temple Street. 21st South Street is an arterial highway
running east and west with stop signs placed so as to stop
traffic coming from the north and south.
The plaintiff
was traveling north on West T'emple and his testimony is
13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that he came to a stop at the stop sign, he waited for some
traffic coming from the west and then looked east and saw
an automobile more than a half a block away, between 400
and 500 feet east of the intersection. He also claims that
there was some traffic coming from the north that required
his attention because a driver might make a left hand turn,
so plaintiff started up and figured that he had plenty of
time to cross the intersection. He never again looked to the
east and his car was struck by the defendant's automobile.
On the other hand the defendant's speed, according to what
the defendant told the investigating officer, was 45 miles per
hour and the posted speed limit for the street was 35 miles
per hour. There were no skid marks before the impact.
The trial court held the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. The defendant no doubt admitted. his own negligence and relied on contributory negligence. There was a
City ordinance similar to the State statute which required
the driver who had stopped at the stop sign to yield the
right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection or which were approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver
having so yielded may proceed and the driver's of all other
vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into
or across the through highway. The court, in analyzing
the case held that when the defendant was 400 to 500 feet
back from the intersection that he was not so close thereto
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but that the court
held that plaintiff had to be more observant and he could
not look only the once and fail to ever look again and that
as a consequence, he was guilty of contributory negligence.
There was a strong descenting opinion, by Judge Wolfe.
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Another interesting case is Conklin vs. Walsh 193 P.
2d 437 and in the syllabus they laid down this:
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to
the favored driver on arterial highway as to disfavored
driver on intersecting street, and neither can excuse
his own failure to observe because the other driver
failed in his duty."
Which to me is the crux that we have before the court in
this case.
In the above case the suit was first tried in the City
Court of Salt Lake City, where judgment was rendered in
favor of the respondents and against the appellants. It was
then appealed to the District Court and tried before a jury.
When both sides had rested the court directed a verict in
favor of the plaintiff Clifford E. Conklin and against the
defendant. In so directing the verdict the court concluded
that both drivers were guilty of negligence, but that Mrs.
Conklin was not an agent or servant of her husband the
plaintiff, and therefor her negligence was not imputable to
him. The two principal questions raised on the appeal are:
(1) Did the Trial Court err in finding that the defendant Robert A. Walsh was negligent as a matter of law.
(2) Did the Trial Court err in finding that Mrs.
Conklin was not the agent or servant of her huband in the
operation of his automobile.
The facts were that the accident happened on South
Temple Street where it is intersected by 0 Street from the
north and by lOth East Street from the south. South
Temple Street is the arterial highway and is 60 feet wide
and 0 Street is 30 feet wide. Mrs. Conklin, driving her
husband's car and taking their daughter to a neighborhood
child's dancing lesson, drove the car out of 0 Street and
south to South Temple. She stopped before entering the
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intersection, claimed she looked both ways and then proceeded to cross the intersection looking straight ahead without again looking to the left and the right. Walsh was
driving east along South Temple at a speed variously estimated at 30 to 45 miles per hour. He claims he saw Mrs.
Conklin drive up towards the intersection and then look in
the opposite direction to see what was coming and when he
looked back she was right in front of him. He-'turned his
vehicle to the right but the accident happened.
The court made some observations about the truck
driver who was traveling up the arterial street and said on
page 439:
"By his own admission the truck driver traveled at
least one quarter of a block without making any further
observation of a car which, at the time he first saw it,
was much nearer the intersection than was his. He asserts his attention was focused on traffic that might be
coming from the south. If, as he claims, he was unable to get a clear view to the south on lOth East Street,
there was nothing to prev·ent him from reducing the
speed of his truck so as to permit a reasonable opportunity to observe the approaching cars from other directions. In this case we have the driver of a truck
traveling between 30 and 45 miles per hour who knows
a car is approaching from his left, keeping his eye on
what he claims to be a blind corner on his right, and ignoring the approach of the vehicle from his left. Because of the assumption that as to the later car he has
the right of way. Under the facts of this case, either
the defendants were or were not, as a matter of law,
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to
the accident!"
Again on the right hand columm, of page 439, speaking of
the relative responsibility of both people on the highway,
the court said :
"The defendant truck driver was not justified in thus
ignoring the movement of plaintiff's automobile. The
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duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver. Neither driver can
excuse his own failure to observe because the other
driver failed in his duty. Neither driver is at any
time to be excused for want of vigilance or failure to
see what is plain to be seen. D·rivers are permitted to
cross over arterial highways after having stopped.
True, they must yield the right of-way to cars which
are close enough to constitute an immediate hazard.
This rule, however, required the ·exercise of some
judgment. There is still a duty on the part of the
driver traveling the arterial highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility of the di§favored driver
starting across the intersection in the belief that he
can cross in safety. The duty of keeping a proper
lookout attends all those operating motor vehicles and
other rules of the road do not relieve any driver of the
necessity of complying with this requirement."
Again on page 440 the court said:
"The driver having failed to s·ee plaintiff's automobile
until too late to a void the collision, we see no escape
from the conclusion that he did not keep a proper lookout and was guilty of negligence in that omission. The
trial court so held."
The court went on to hold that there is no family purpose
doctrine in the use of an automobile in the State of Utah.
This being the husband's car, the negligence of the wife was
not imputable to the husband and consequently the judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed and the man on the arterial highway, who failed to
keep a proper lookout, even though he was a favored driver,
was held to have driven negligently and that his negligence
was a proximate cause of the injury.
Another interesting case was Hardman vs. Thurman et
a1 239 P. 2d 215. This was an action by Ruth Bunker
Hardman, an administratrix of her husband's estate against
Thurman and Wood, doing business as Dickey Wood Pro-
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duce Company. This was an intersection case and took
place about 9 :30 P. M. on October 29, 1949, at the corner of
21st South and State Street in Salt Lake City. It appears
that south of 21st South Street there are six lanes of traffic
and north of 21st South Street there are four. At the time
of the accident, Mrs. Hardiman was driving in a southerly
direction on State Street and intended to turn east on 21st
South Street. Her husband was riding in the front seat
with her, holding their small child. She was driving in the
lane next to the center lane. It appears that she stopped
at 21st South Street momentarily to permit north bound
traffic to proceed through the intersection. On the opposite side an oil tanker was proceeding north in the first lane
east of the center lane and it had stopped at the south line
of the intersection and signaled for a left turn to go west.
There was a second car in the lane east of the oil tanker
which was proceeding north but it stopped so that Mrs.
Hardman could turn left and Mrs. Hardman observed no
car in the third lane to the east, but as her car reached a
point where it would be crossing the third traffic lane to the
east if said lane had extended out in the intersection, the
trailer truck operated by the defendants in the third driving lane came through the intersection and struck the Hardman car sideways and knocked it across to the north curb.
Mr. Hardman received injuries from which he died the following day. There were some tire marks of the truck
trailer which showed the distance the wheels, or some of
them skidded when the brakes were applied. The speed of
the truck was estimated at various speeds from 20 to 42
miles per hour. The speed on State Street at 21st South
was 40 miles per hour and 35 miles per hour north of that
intersection. A physicist who was called to testify as an
expert on the basis of the skid marks and the weight of the
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trailer estimated the speed at 42 miles per hour. The
driver testified that he was only driving 20 miles per hour.
The defendant sought reversal on the following grounds:
(1) That the court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, since there is no evidence in the
record to support a finding of negligence upon the part of
the driver of defendant's trailer truck and. that the evidence requires the finding that the driver of decedent's car
was negligent.
(2) That incompetent evidence was admitted.
(3) That the court erred. in refusing to give certain
instructions requested by defendant.
The first ground is the one that, for the purpose of this
case, we would be interested in. The court said on the left
hand column, page 217:
"The assignments directed at the lack of evidence of
negligence upon the part of the driver of defendant's
truck is overruled. The testimony of such driver was
itself such as to warrant the finding that he was driving negligently in the following particulars : ( 1) There
was some evidence in the record from which the jury
could conclude that from the driver's elevated position
in the cab of the truck he would be able to see the
Hardman car as it proceeded to make a turn on TwentyFirst South Street. He admitted that he did not see
it until after he got into the intersection. If he did
not see the Hardman car, he was negligent by reason of
being inattentive, and in proceeding into the intersection without ascertaining whether it was safe for him
to proceed. (2) In traveling at an excessive rate of
speed under the circumstances into the intersection.
The evidence adduced relative to the speed of the
truck, plus the fact that there was a car stopped to his
left although the green light was showing southward,
would indicate that it was not safe to proceed through
the intersection. The fact that he was unable to bring
his truck to a stop within 30 feet after the application
of the brakes, as required by Sec. 57-7-205 (b,c) would
warrant a conclusion that he was traveling at a greater
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speed than 20 miles per hour. As evidenced by the
length of the tire marks, 126 feet, less the length of the
trailer-truck, 51 feet, the truck moved forward about 75
feet from the point where the truck finally stopped.
From the point where the brakes were applied to the
point of impact, the truck moved about 30 feet, and
from the point of impact the Hardman car was pushed sideways a little over 45 feet. (3) In failing to
yield the right of way to a vehicle in the intersection
in the act of turning in accordance with Sec. 57-7-137,
U.C.A. 1943, which section we will have occasion to
refer to in connection with the defendants' argument
relative to negligence on the part of the driver of the
Hardman car."
The court then went on to distinguish that case from the
Cederloff vs. Whited, Supra and French vs. Utah Oil Refining Company, Supra. The interesting thing about this
cas·e is however, that the court points out that the defendant, because of his position on the road, could have seen
and thereby had to be alert. That if he did not see what
was plainly before him, then he was inattentive, which is
negligence. That he was traveling at an exccessive rate of
speed and a speed in excess of Sec. 57-7-205, which is similar with slight changes made that require faster stopping
at the present time to our Section 41-6-144 in the 1953 code.
Another Utah case is French vs. Utah Oil Refining
Company 216 P. 2d 1002. In that action plaintiff was driving an automobile north on Se-cond West Street in Salt Lake
City, which is an arterial highway. The defendant was
driving south along the same street. North of 4th South
on Second West Street there is a four lane highway and
south of 4th South there is a two lane highway. As plaintiff approached the intersection of 4th South and Second
West he intended to turn west or make a left turn. The
green light was shining and he therefore proceeded into the
intersection and as he crossed its south border, he noticed
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some traffic coming from the opposite direction. One being
the defendant's vehicle in the west lane. It appears that
he first saw the truck 100 to 120 feet north of the intersection, the exact distance could not be determined, but did
not see it again until it was about six feet from the point
of impact. It appears as he turned left and reached the
west limit of the intersection, the truck came through and
struck him on the right side. The truck stopped almost at
the point of impact, but the force of the collision turned and
pushed plaintiff's car about four feet. Plaintiff estimated
his spe·ed at about 8 miles per hour and the speed of the
truck about 20 to 25 miles an hour. The court said that
while it was doubtful that plaintiff established any negligence on the part of the defendant's driver, they weren't
going into that question because the court held the plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence. The Section involved
was Sec. 57-7-137, similar to our Sec. 41-6-73. The court
went on, on page 1003 and said:
"Accordingly excessive speed of the truck or inaccurate
estimation by the plaintiff of its rate ·of movement forward is not involved."
There being no speed problem involved, the court went
on in its deliberations to show that if they took the speed of
both vehicles that the impact was bound to occur at the
point where it did. Consequently it was not safe for the
plaintiff to conclude that he could turn and that as a consequence the truck was so close that it could say as a matter
of law, it constituted a hazard. Counsel for defendant
claims that this case is not in point with the case that we
have before the court for the reason that speed in our case
is a vital factor. The ability of the plaintiff to stop his
car, is a vital factor when he exceeds the speed limit. His
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ability to always have his car under control is a vital factor
when he exceeds the speed limit. His ability to actually see
what is before him is also reduced when speed is involved.
Another Utah case is Yeates vs. Budge 252 P. 2d 220.
This is a case that was appealed from the First District. It
appears that there were two actions that were combined.
One Yeates vs. Budge and one Budge vs. Yeates, growing
out of an automobile accident that took place at the point
of the "Y" just south of Logan. The accident occured September 11, 1951, at the junction on this "Y". Mrs. Yeates
had left Logan and was proceeding south on the outside
west lane, intending to take the highway to Nibley. She
gave an arm signal and moved into the inside lane, next to
the double center line. Her speed was 25 miles per hour.
Budge was traveling northeast on U. S. Highway 91 approaching the junction. It appears that Mrs. Yeates saw
the other car and knew that the other car intended to go
into Logan, but that without signaling she applied her
brakes and turned her car to the left across the path of the
Budge vehicle, not knowing whether she could safely proceed or not. A collision took place when the front end of
her automobile was over the center line and her car was
practically stopped. Budge testified that he was doing approximately 35 miles per hour. He had seen the Yeates
vehicle from about 500 feet up the road, but there was an
ambulance that was coming and he decreased his speed
further. He had no idea that Mrs. Yeates intended to go
to Nihley until the two vehicles were about 25 to 30 feet
apart, and she abruptly turned across his path without signaling beforehand her intention to do so. That he applied
his brakes and turned to the right, but struck the right
front end of her car. It appeared from the measurement of
skid marks, after subtracting the length of the automobiles
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that the cars were about 40 feet apart when the brakes on
both cars were applied. The court said on page 223, left
column:
"While the evidence was all to the effect that Budge's
speed was below the posted speed limit, the court could
h~ve reasonably found that it was too fast for existing conditions. However, in view of the fact that Mrs.
Yeates admittedly did not signal her intention to turn
on the Highway 101, that there was testimony and physical evidence that Mrs. Yeates made her turn when
Budge was only 40 feet away, it was not unreasonable
to conclude that Budge's negligence was not a proximate
cause of the ensuing accident (in order to stop in 40
feet a vehicle could only be traveling about 20 miles an
hour according to figures published by the Utah Highway Patrol) the front wheels of the Y,eates car were
only 9 feet over the center lines when the collision occurred, indicating that Budge was very close when she
turned to cross his path. Thus the lower court could
have concluded that had Budge been driving at a proper
speed in view of existing .conditions, he would have
nevertheless been helpless to stop short of colliding
with the Yeates vehicle. It is no answer to say that
Budge could have avoided the accident by turning to
the left and pass to the rear or the west of the Yeates
vehicle, since to have done so would have placed Budge
on the wrong side of the four lane highway at a curve.
We cannot say the lower court was compelled to find
him negligent in not doing so, even though there was
testimony that the west side of the highway at that
point was free from traffic."
Consequently in this case we have no speed violation involved. The turning was so close that regardless of speed a
person could not have avoided the accident; no signal was
given and consequently the decision was affirmed.
Another interesting case was Whisler vs. Weiss cited
as 174 P. 2d 766; this was before the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington, November 21st, 1946. This was a
very lengthy and involved case. One party, Whisler, was
driving south on a through street. Weiss was going west
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to a stop sign. There was a blind side. Weiss moved out
and saw the car of Whisler 150 to 200 feet down the Street
and tried to drive across, but the accident took place. The
lower court tried the case without a jury and found defendant entitled to recover, on a cross complaint, and denied
the plaintiff any right of recovery. There was a motion for
vacating judgment and a new trial. The court then vacated and held both parties guilty of negligence and t.hen the
appeal was the result, and the appeal was sustained. The
court said on page 774, right hand column:
"(3.4) It is true Mrs. Whisler was on the arterial, and
we think, under the evidence, it can be said that her car
and the Weiss car were simultaneously approaching a
However, we have often
point in the intersection.
· stated, that all rights of way are relative, and the duty
to avoid accidents or collisions at street intersections
rests upon both drivers. While it is true that the primary duty of avoiding accidents rests upon the driver
to the left, the favored driver, whether he be such by
reason of being on an arterial highway or on the right,
cannot proceed to cross an intersection regardless of
what conditions may confront him relative to traffic
approaching from the opposite direction.
(5) It should also be kept in mind that there is a blinker light over the center of this intersection, which is
a warning to drivers on this arterial, as well as to drivers on the stop street, to drive cautiously.
· · In the instant case, the trial court was justified in
assuming that Mrs. Whisler had she been using reasonable care to watch out for traffic as she approached
this intersection, could and should have seen the Weiss
car when she was at least 150 feet from the intersection.
Had she been excercising such care, she could and
should have seen the Weiss car move out into the intersection, apparently with the intention of crossing ahead
of her. However, she testified she saw no car in the
intersection as she approached it, and did not see the
Weiss car until she was near the middle of the intersection, when she first saw it coming directly toward
her on the left and about 15 feet away. Mrs. Whisler's
sister did not see the Weiss car at all."
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion I call the Court's attention to the physical
facts which are not disputed.
Plaintiff left tire marks
for 148 feet to point of collision and 42 feet thereafter. He
smashed into defendant's big Mercury Sedan with such
force to turn it around in the opposite direction and throw
it back up the road 72 feet. Could this have possibly taken
place unless plaintiff was traveling at least 60 miles an hour
when his brakes were applied? If he was going that fast,
he was then in a 40 mile ~one.
Also, the defendant must drive from a position on the east
side of the highway and at a point 20 to 30 feet south of it
in a northwest direction and he does it 5 to 6 miles per hour.
He is in a position on the highway where he can be seen by
by plaintiff all of the distance yet plaintiff says he does not
see him until he starts west into his lane in the· intersection.
Where, in the name of heaven was the plaintiff looking?
He was required by statute to be alert; to reduce his speed
at intersections; to see what's plainly before him; to drive
at a speed so his car is always under control; so that his car
can stop if needs be and avoid a collision. Did he do any of
this? No. So the Court said he was guilty of negligence,
but the Court also said because the defendant turned left
the full responsibility is on him and plaintiff is forgiven.
I do not believe this is the law. I think such a principle is
dangerous and would just add to the conflict and woes of all
users of the highway. T'his defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the lower court
and hold plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence.
Respectfully submitted
Walter G. Mann
Attorney for defendant
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